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Patent Office cases holding to the contrary, but, following the trend, it is
very likely that both the courts and the Patent Office will tend more and
more to deny registration or use of a mark used for drugs when adopted
by another concern for cosmetics or vice versa. In this connection, of course,
the doctrine of secondary meaning is important.
It is evident in this field at least that the courts in determining the
likelihood of confusion as to source in the trade-mark cases are placing
more emphasis on the interests of the producer. Ex parte McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 73 U.S.P.Q. 296 (1947); United Drug Co. v. Ar-Ex Cos-
metics, Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q. 362 (1946); Antoine de Paris, Inc. v. Napoli-
tan, 60 U.S.P.Q. 252 (1944); Marshall Field & Co. v. Betts &
Mumpeton, Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q. 425 (1931).
With the dropping of the dilution doctrine, the courts have kept the
interest of both the original producer and the infringer in the back-
ground and have generally favored the "confusion as to source or product
test" in determining trade-mark infringement. However, it can be said
that in light of the food, drug, and cosmetic cases, supra, that the rights
of the producer, in this particular field at least, are given more consider-
ation.
So far as we are able to bring the descriptive qualities of the plain-
tiff's products in the instant case within the rule applied in the food, drug,
and cosmetic cases it may be predicted that the interests of the plaintiff
in his trade marks "Tabu" and "Taboo" as used in conjunction with the
sale of toiletries and perfumes, will be enhanced. It is doubtful that this
would bear on the instant case because of the descriptive variance of
these goods with the defendant's products. The courts have come to place
more emphasis, in this particular field at least, upon the propensity of the
producer to branch out into products not immediately related to his main
product. On its face this tendency approaches the dilution doctrine in
protecting the producer's right to expand into other commercial fields.
Paul R. Jackiewicz.
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ANGLO-AmERICAN LAW, A FiRST BooK, ON. Second Edition. By Charles
Herman Kinnane.1 Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,
1952. Pp. xvi, 810. $8.50. - Here is a book which should find a place in
every law and social science library. In 700 pages, Professor Kinnane
gives the reader not only a presentation of the historical development of
Anglo-American law, but also some observations which might be con-
I Professor of Law, De Paul University.
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sidered as an introduction to the study of jurisprudence and sociology of
law. The first 160 pages (six chapters) are devoted to these subjects.
In those introductory remarks, the author explains different theories
concerning law, its necessity and place in society, its way of functioning
and sources. He cites various definitions of law but does not commit him-
self to any one; like many modern legal scientists in the United States
and on the Old Continent (e.g., Professor Scelle in Paris), instead of
giving his own definition, he is rather prone to assert that law defies any
definition.
The first part of the book is too inclusive to be more than superficial
in quite a few instances. However, it should be kept in mind that it was
written primarily for laymen and can serve as an introduction to legal
studies. The problems include a short philosopy of criminal law and a
concise but good characterization of the totalitarian systems of law.
After those preliminary observations the author passes, in the second
part of the book, to the main features of ancient systems of law and
makes some good remarks about the civilizing influence of the Roman
law. Then he reaches the very subject of his study: the Anglo-American
law.
The approach of the author is historical. He begins his story with pre-
Norman law in England, then characterizes the Norman period, passes
to the origin of Common Law, explains the growth of equity law, and
devotes a chapter to canon law, its place in the whole system and its
influence upon the English law. Next, he turns to the law merchant and
gives the reader an idea about the contribution of maritime law and
commercial law. Part II of the book is closed by rather extensive, per-
haps even lenghty, in proportion to other topics, observations about ad-
ministrative law.
The next two parts of the book present "modern" English and Ameri-
can law. Passing from England to the United States, the author explains
the reception of the common lay system in this country by the fact that
the United States and England have a common language. It seems that
this factor, important as it was, has been overstressed by the author. As
some legal scholars such as Pound 2 and Hurst 3 have demonstrated, the
result of the competition between common and civil law in the first years
of the Union was largely dependent upon the success of state legislation,
since the civil law system was considered as based on legislative action.
The complete failure of the legislative branch of government in the form-
ative period of the law in this country was an important element which
contributed to the victory of the courts and their common law system.
Part III is essentially devoted to the organization of the courts in
England and the United States, as Part IV is similarly devoted to pro-
2 POUND, THE FORmATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (1938).
3 HuRsr, THE GROWTH OF AmERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAYERS (1950).
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cedure and remedies. Thus, the whole system of law is viewed from the
angle of objective rather than subjective law. True, the development of
the English substantive law was strictly connected with procedure and
cannot be separated from it; but it has been proven4 that the matter can
be presented by emphasizing subjective law. Thus, both methods are
possible. But under the approach chosen by Professor Kinnane the reader
may get the idea that there is no law outside of court litigation, an idea
which the author himself 'seems to condemn. In fact, he remarks very
aptly about the devotion in the American legal education to the "case
system" and asserts that the over-emphasizing of the "precedents" makes
the student look backward instead of seeing "what is going on in the
world now" and "what is in the making for tomorrow." r As one of the
remedies, the author suggests laying more stress upon legislation and
studying the legislative process itself 6 - an idea which has already been
carried out at the Law School of the University of Notre Dame.
The suggestions of the author as to the improvement of legal education
are but one example of his modern ideas. Many other examples can be
cited. In quite a few instances he expresses his admiration for the Anglo-
American law and the creative genius of the generations that contributed
to the entire system. But he is aware of all its shortcomings and its
excessive conservatism, and voices an impressive plea for improvement.
He deplores the diversity of the legal systems of the American states - a
phenomenon which is rare even in federal countries - and advocates the
necessity for a body of American national law.7 By simple, clear, and
infallibly logical arguments he convinces the reader that quite a few
changes in the existing legal system are indispensable in order to keep
abreast with the progress of humanity. Thus, the simplicity of adminis-
trative procedure should serve as an example for all the branches of
law;8 the obsolete general verdict system should be abolished; 9 in civil
cases the whole jury system with its antiquated rules of evidence is out-
worn and should be modified or eliminated; 10 and in criminal cases, the
modern society calls for the abolishment of many rules, as in particular
that the state has no right to appeal from an acquittal." Many changes
in procedure are necessary, such as the introduction of a "true appeal" in
all cases,12 and a complete break with the remnants of the old formulary
procedure13 as the persistance of the common law system of actions
4 See, e.g., HoLmEs, THE Coimoi LAW (1881).
5 Text at 441.
6 Ibid.
7 Text at 491.
8 Id. at 548.
9 Id. at 572.
10 Id. at 576.
11 Id. at 596.
12 Id. at 603.
,13 Id. at 611.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
accounted for "traps and pitfalls . . . frustration and . . . anguish and
... defeats of justice." 14
The book is permeated with the desire to render the law accessible to
rich and poor, simple and understandable to anyone. But, in connection
with the question of morals, the reader is surprised that the author gives
a somewhat lax "moral code" for the legal profession. Instead of stressing
the high responsibility of lawyers in the society and encouraging them to
be guided in their practice not only by legal rules but also by ethical
principles, he absolves any action of the advocate made "to defend and
protect his clients under the existing state of the law." 15 True, he asserts
that he does not intend to give the legal counsel "general absolution for
any wrongs he might have committed, merely because he is a lawyer," 16
and draws the attention of the reader to the professional canons of
ethics and conscience of each lawyer. But those short observations are
weak when compared with arguments advanced on behalf of lawyers who
assist their clients
1 7
... by proper means to secure an advantage which the law gives him, either
by way of claim or defense, - save possibly in those cases where the law is
so much at variance with morals and decency that no citizen, whether
lawyer or not, should abide by the law.
Of course, the expression "abide by the law" is not well chosen and
should be replaced by "take such .advantages as he lawfully can." It
ensues that the lawyer is excused for having the most lax conscience in
all society, since only when "no citizen" would disregard morals and
decency the lawyer is to respect them, and then only "possibly." Thus,
the observations of the author are not surprising; they tend to convince
the reader that whatever means are used by the lawyer to defend an
accused are good if the advocate "can invoke the laws society has
made." 18
But there are many wrongs and immoralities which can be committed
by unscrupulous lawyers even without direct violation of any legal rules
or canons of ethics, and it is certain that many miscarriages of justice
were committed because of lawyers who have taken advantage of differ-
ent technicalities or defenses not prohibited by law. It seems that it would
be appropriate, particularly in a book written primarily for prospective
lawyers, to emphasize the moral side of the legal profession and to con-
vince the readers that ethical considerations should guide them through-
out their legal practice.
It has been pointed out that the author gave interesting observations
about ancient systems of law. In addition, in describing the historical
14 Id. at 638.
15 Id. at 146.
16 Id. at 147.
17 Ibid.
18 Text at 148.
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development of English law, he made many references to the influence of
Roman law, either direct or through canon or civil law. It is the great
merit of the author that he applied this comparative approach in his
study. As a matter of fact, too many American lawyers do not even
realize that in various instances there may be quite different solutions
and approaches than those provided by their own law. The interdepend-
ence of different systems of law is masterfully presented by the author.
It could be wished that he had used the same comparative approach in
describing also the present state of the law. True, he does so in a few
cases: e.g., he commends the civil law procedure in which the judge
rather than counsel is in active charge of the conduct of the trial,19 but he
neglects to make appropriate comparisons in many cases. Thus, he em-
phasizes "the stress in various quarters on the need for an improved 'pre-
trial' procedure," 20 but does not mention that in civil law countries this
procedure has been extensively applied for a long time: he suggests that
"the use of several judges instead of ... only one judge in court trials" is
often advisable although not practiced,21 but makes no reference to good
results obtained by the application of this method in many European
states: he asserts that a jury of less than twelve "has some advantages," 22
but does not cite the fact that recently the number of jurors in France
has been reduced to seven. On another occasion, he makes a reference to
France and states that in that country "the judicial courts are precluded
as a rule from reviewing administrative action," 23 but does not mention
anything about the special system of administrative courts in that coun-
try, the highest of which, the Conseil d'Etat, enjoys a prestige no smaller
than that of the Cour de Cassation and is a powerful check on the action
of the administrative bodies.
However, considering the length of the book, it was impossible for the
author to give all the examples that could have been given in order to
fully develop his numerous observations. He tried to be concise in order
to cover the base area under consideration. Probably some of the ques-
tionable statements that are found in the book can be explained in this
way. Thus, he states that there is: 24
•.. a notable difference between a city ordinance and an administrative 'rule.'
Generally a city has no authority to give effect to its ordinances outside its
own local territory. By way of contrast, a county administrative body may
be authorized to prescribe a rule applicable throughout a whole county....
In reality there is no contrast in the two instances given by the author;
both exemplify the fact that each authority is limited in the exercising of
its power to the area over which it has jurisdiction. Another objectionable
19 Id. at 600 n. 6.
20 Id. at 548 n. 14.
21 Id. at 550.
22 Id. at 560.
23 Id. at 422.
24 Id. at 70.
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statement is the author's suggestion that one of the several ways of doing
the judicial work under a federal system is that, "All federal courts might
be abolished and the courts of the states authorized to apply the federal
law... ." 2 5 Actually, there is no federal state existing without a federal
court, and the author's suggestion seems impracticable. Under such a
system the federal law would receive various interpretations in state
courts and a disorganization of the whole federal structure might ensue.
Lastly, the author unnecessarily gives an abbreviated text of Article
VI of the Constitution, without even indicating the omission: "This
Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in
every state shall be bound thereby .... ," 26 Thus, the supremacy clause
has been limited by the author to the Federal Constitution alone, and an
uninitiated reader may wonder how it is that the author draws from the
Constitution the conclusion that the supremacy clause includes federal
laws and treaties.
Although the book was written primarily for laymen in a simple and
easily readable language, it undoubtedly is of great value to every lawyer.
Some sections of the book, such as those discussing the history of the
action of ejectment or detinue, may seem of little interest to a layman
but will be appreciated by lawyers who wish to supplement their practical
knowledge by some philosophical and historical foundations. Undoubted-
ly, the book will not only help them to systematize the ideas acquired
piecemeal during their "case method" studies and their practice, but will
also give them some information they lacked, particularly in the field of
ancient and Roman law. And in any course in legal history, Professor
Kinnane's book should be the first required to be read by the students.
Wienczyslaw J. Wagner*
HOLMES - LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935. VOLS. I AND II. Edited by
Mark Dewolfe Howe.' Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Pp.
xvi, 1650. $12.50. How different these two volumes are from the Holmes-
Pollock Letters. In the latter, two men in their prime exchanged ideas
and occasional thoughts within a very definite framework common to
both of them, i.e., the great traditions of the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem. There is no limitless rambling in the Holmes-Pollock correspond-
ence; how much one may disagree with some of their statements and
thoughts it was an aesthetic pleasure and an intellectural adventure to
25 Id. at 473-4 n. 6.
26 Id. at 476.
* Instructor in Law, University of Notre Dame.
1 Professor of Law, Harvard University School of Law.
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read their letters. Correspondence between two great men is a form of
conversation - and we find exactly that in the Holmes-Pollock Letters.
On the other hand, the Holmes-Laski correspondence here under review
is typical of an age in which the art of conversation - oral and written
- seems to be waning. Conversation is being replaced by the argumenta-
tive, self-advertising monologue which today we even find taking hold of
what used to be the inner recesses of culture and learning.
One of the keys to an understanding of the Holmes-Laski Letters is
the fact that when they met for the first time in July, 1916, Holmes had
passed his 75th birthday - and Laski was twenty-three. This seems to
explain why Justice Holmes' contributions to his correspondence do not
provide any new aspects of his personality and thought. His letters are
mostly an expression of the rather placid pleasure which the octogenarian
took in still being in touch with the living, developing and pulsing world
of the younger generations. Holmes' attitude throughout all these years
of correspondence was highlighted by two letters. The first, written on
March 31, 1920, when Laski was leaving for England, said, "Your
intellectual companionship.., have enriched life to me very greatly and
it will be hard not to look forward to seeing you in bodily presence.
However, I shall get your letters and that will be much." 2 And twelve
years later, November 23, 1932, in what obviously was Holmes' last
letter to Laski he repeated, "If you keep a list of charities - my name
should lead all the rest.... You see how hard I find it to write - my
affection is unabated - but I can no more. Please keep on writing to
me." 3
Laski's part of this correspondence consists mainly of rambling repeti-
tious bibliographies and of reports on his encounters with the great and
semi-great of his days. Considering his high degree of activity, academ-
ic, political, and social, it seems. physically hardly feasible for Laski to
have actually read all the books referred to by him in his letters; and
even if he did read them the time necessary for evaluation and mental
integration must have been completely lacking. In his letter of March 20,
1917, Laski laid down the following two rules on the art of reading: 4
"I am clear that in reading one ought to have two rules - (a) to know
one subject inside out and (b) to have an eye on what the rest of the
world is doing." However, the' snappy and unwarranted comments
frequently made in his letters seem to testify to a rather habitual viola-
tion of Laski's own ideas on reading.
Laski's letters confirm the rule that correspondence usually offers a
better insight into the working of a man's mind than his formal writings.
On the subject of sovereignty - so important and central an idea in
2 Text at 256.
3 Id. at 1420-21.
4 Id. at 68.
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Laski's thought - we see him squirm and contradict himself continuous-
ly. Referring to Holmes' statement in McDonald v. Mabee, that "the
foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," 5 Laski wrote on March 20,
1917, "that on the main heads we are in substantial agreement." Only to
continue in the very next sentence, "I don't think sovereignty is any-
thing more than a balance of forces and I am anxious to stay the implicit
theocratising of any other attitude." 6 This has to be read and under-
stood in the light of earlier letters which prove that Laski either did not
or did not want to understand Justice Holmes. Laski had written on July
22, 1916, about eight months previous to the above statement, "It seems
to me that the groups... are simply basic and I am human enough to
read sovereignty in terms of their consent." 7 And again on September
16, 1916, he wrote: 8
My problem is to take away from the state the superior morality with
which we have invested its activities and give them back to the individual
conscience. Isn't there far too great a dread of responsibility today - a
tendency to push things on to the government as an ultimate reservoir
which excuses individual thinking.
By 1925 Laski had moved so far from this position that Holmes, com-
menting in his letters of July 23, 1925, on Laski's Grammar of Politics,
wrote: 9
I think I perceive at critical moments a tacit assumption that papa Laski,
or those who think like him, are to regulate paternally the popular desires.
If a man makes a great fortune by selling some patent medicine to the
crowdthat shows that in those circumstances the crowd wants it - and I
can see no justification in a government's undertaking to rectify social
desires - except upon an aristocratic assumption that you know what is
good for them better than they-[adding, perhaps ironically, in parenthesis]
(which no doubt you do).
In his early days Laski seems to have been aware of some of the short-
comings of Holmes' basic position and he posed the problems quite cor-
rectly; unfortunately, the solutions he came up with were erroneous and
dangerous ones. In his letter of December 8, 1917, Laski said: 10
You seem to stop before Duguit .. . begins. You say that what the courts
pronounce is law. So it is; but it is not less important to know the sources
whence it derives .... Duguit says that more and more the courts will have
to pronounce a law that takes into account the modern disposition of
economic forces. . . . The truth is that we are witnessing a revival of
Cnatural" law and "natural" is the purely inductive statement of certain
minimum conditions we can't do without if life is to be decent.... [They
represent] the movement towards the inductive realisation [sic.] of these
"natural" rights into a generalised [sic.] social scheme in which broad hap-
5 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
6 Text at 68.
7 Id. at 7.
8 Id. at 23.
9 Id. at 762.
10 Id. at 116-17.
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piness ... will be realised [sk.] after a hell of a row to get it. Russia has
started a movement of which the evolution is still only at the beginning.
Some of the more important writings of Duguit had been translated by
Mr. and Mrs. Laski into English and Laski could never again free him-
self of Duguit's influence.
Laski's mind as revealed by these letters was full of the most amazing
lacunae and misconceptions. Small wonder, therefore, that he continuous-
ly confused natural law and natural rights, and that we find the following
comment on the traditional natural law doctrine: 11
I should therefore argue that the Christian ethic was at no point of itself
a liberating influence until it rediscovered natural law in the Scholastic
revival. I put all this to a Jesuit from Louvain who is in this hotel and he
was so horrified that I was tempted to feel that I might be right.
And on January 18, 1930, he wrote: 12
I read, too, a clever book by a Belgian professor, La philosophic du droit
positif - one Dabin - an able defence of a modified Austinianism such
as you would like. But he is also a Catholic, and it was amusing to note
how medieval natural law would creep in every so often....
Such a statement is a typical example of Laski's sloppy reading habits
which quite frequently led him to making entirely unsubstantiated and
unwarranted comments. To call Dabin's teachings " a modified Austin-
ianism" can be justified on one assumption only i.e., to have read the
first paragraph of Dabin's book and to have stopped there for good.
Professor Buckland's opposition to traditional natural law concepts is
too well known to suspect him of any leniency towards Dabin's work; and
he referred to the very same book which Laski had called "an able
defence of modified Austinianism with the following words: "For him
[Dabin] the enquiry into the rational basis of law is in the moral field,
quite outside the juristic." '3
The farther we get in reading these letters the more are we struck by
Laski's increasing self-adoration, by his repetitiveness and - most de-
plorable of all - by the shallowness of his statements. This correspond-
ence demonstrates one of the great tragedies of the modem mind - its
unceasing attempt to grow in width without ever growing in depth.
William H. Roberts*
11 Id. at 1083.
12 Id. at 1218.
13 BucXLAND, SoME REFLECTIONS ON JURISPRUDENCE 11 (1945).
* Professor of Political Science, Catholic University of America.
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THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNI-
FICANCE: Second Lectures in the Roscoe Pound Lectureship Series. By
Arthur T. Vanderbilt.' Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1953.
Pp. 144. $2.50. During the last two decades numerous funeral orations
have been pronounced over the "remains" of the separation of powers
doctrine.2 The "corpse" won't stay dead. Chief Justice Vanderbilt of
New Jersey shows why. The American people "instinctively sense" that
the "freedom so essential to both the individual and to our civiliza-
tion" 3 can be insured only through the "reign of law"; the "reign of law,
in contrast to the tyranny of power, may be achieved only through
separating appropriately the several powers of government." 4
In the first lecture Judge Vanderbilt reviews the doctrine historically
as part of the American heritage of constitutionalism, and draws instruc-
tive lessons in liberty from the fate of the doctrine in other lands. The
second lecture shows how the doctrine is threatened at home by the
dominance of the Federal government over the states and of the execu-
tive over the legislature. The final lecture analyzes "judicial deference"
as a conspicuous cause of present-day "constitutional imbalance."
Mention of the word "imbalance" will arouse those who dismiss the
whole checks and balances apparatus of the Constitution as embodying
the "mechanistic" or "Swiss watch" theory of government, 5 which is
obsolete today when triumphant democracy through universal suffrage
provides in the ballot the only really necessary check.6 Having such a
check, we are told we can let the "balances" go. They are derived from
a time when it was assumed that between government and people there
was an essential antagonism and every governmental act was therefore
suspected.7 Today, Liberty does not need Cokes to thunder to Kings that
they are also "under the law." Leviathan is a prisoner. Democracy has
made government a servant, and the "Police State" a "Service State."
We can by our votes "turn the rascals out." Thus, we need not fear even
when the administrative process "bends" judicial doctrine and procedure
to "realistic curvatures," 8 and Liberty is not endangered when executive,
legislative and judicial functions are blended in a single administrative
agency. Do we not elect the legislative creators of these "bent" or
1 Chief Justice, New Jersey Supreme Court.
2 CARROw, THE BACKGROUND OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1948); LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938) ; RIKER, DEMOcRAcY IN THE UNITED STATES (1953) ;
Coil, Remarks on the Separation of Powers: A Reply to Professor Kinnane, 38
A.B.A.J. 365 (1952); Kinnane, Some Observations on Separation of Powers, 38
A.B.A.J. 19 (1952).
3 Text in Introduction.
4 Id. at 37.
5 PAnovER, THE COMPLETE MADISON 13 (1953).
6 CARROW, op. cit. supra note 2, at 140-142; RxER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 160.
7 C Raow, op. cit. supra note 2, at 140.
8 LANDIS, THE ADmNISTRATIVE PROCESS as quoted in text at 6.
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"blended" agencies? If they do harm we can vote out the legislature,
and by killing the creators, we can kill the creatures. (Presumably, the
time-lag in this indirect process of homicide by ballot is a minor matter.)
So runs the newer thesis which proponents of a revitalized separation of
powers, like Judge Vanderbilt, face today.
Judge Vanderbilt does not give us just another anthology of historic
American affirmations of the doctrine he defends. He quotes indeed, once
more, Washington, Adams, Jefferson and Madison and cites again
Montesquieu and other eighteenth century sources to which the authors
of the Constitution turned. Madison sums them all up in the wise
warning: 9
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.
True, the "Father of the Constitution" did not discuss in detail the
modem thesis that whatever the value of separation of powers as a
political principle on the higher levels may be, there is no need to fear
its violation in the concentration of functions in a subordinate agency,
responsible to officials who are in turn responsible to the people. The
fifty-first number of the Federalist, however, did anticipate and answer
the heart of the modem view: 10
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be neces-
sary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself,
but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In fram-
ing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependency
on the people is, no doubt the primary control on the government; but
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
(Emphasis added).
Judge Vanderbilt does not, however, rest his case upon appeals to
authority. He will have separation of powers stand on its own legs in a
mid-twentieth century world. Readers of his lectures may decide whether
his comparative survey of the status of the doctrine in other lands cor-
roborates Madison, Jefferson, Adams and Washington. In Soviet Russia,
Andrei Vyshinsky declares that the "program of the All-Union Commun-
ist Party (of Bolsheviks) rejects the bourgeois principle of separation of
powers." 11 Thus the "judgments" of Soviet "courts" may be set aside
by an executive body. The halting acceptance of the doctrine in the
Weimar Constitution of the Second Reich made it easy for Adolf Hitler
9 Tni FEmRmArIsv, No. 47 at 313 (The Modern Library ed. 1937).
lo Id., No. 51 at 337.
11 VysurNsxy, Ta ,-LAw or THE SovirT STATE 318 (1948), quoted in text at 8.
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to take over, behind the facade of that Constitution, all governmental
functions and even to change the Constitution, by executive decree.'
2
Many Latin American executives, may almost at will, declare an emer-
gency and assume unlimited powers.' 3 In France of the Fourth Republic,
the executive is exercising legislative powers "in flat defiance of the
plain words" of the French Constitution, and no French court "will even
hear a protest against such conduct." 14 Too serious to suggest by a facile
post hoc ergo propter hoc that strict adherence to separation of powers
would have saved fundamental human rights in some of these now tragic
lands, Judge Vanderbilt's survey entitles him to ask: whether in our con-
fused times there is a more depressing fact than the widespread failure to
correlate the time-worn separation of powers doctrine with the rule of
law, and the rule of law in turn, with the preservation and protection of
individual freedom and basic human dignities? The question makes an
issue for protagonists of administrative justice, like Dean Landis, former
chairman of SEC. Dean Landis brushed aside the doctrine as the work of
an "Aristotelian theoretician" and a "page of theory in Montesquieu." 15
In his second lecture, Judge Vanderbilt discusses the threat to the
separation of powers doctrine (and indeed, to constitutional government
itself) in the increasing centralization of powers and functions in our
Federal government at the expense of local self-government, and in the
dominance of the Federal executive over the legislative branch. The two
phenomena are closely related as cause and effect. Economic depression,
emergency or "crisis" experimentation to meet its problems, followed by
wars, now "hot," now "cold," and the role of world leadership thrust
suddenly upon our peace-loving people, seemed to require quick action
at the national level. The result has been a growth in administrative law
accelerated by the practice of delegation of wide powers to the executive
by the legislative branch. Since the exercise of such delegated adminis-
trative power must be uniform throughout the nation, the areas of state
and local activity have been correspondingly curtailed. With this has
come the development of the "administrative" mind, impatient of re-
straint, contemptuous of older judicial and constitutional limitations.
Review space here forbids detailed quotations from Judge Vanderbilt's
illustrations, but one cannot resist at least referring the reader to a classic
example of the "administrative" mind at work in the recommendation of
the late Secretary of Labor, Maurice Tobin. He stated that we need a
national labor law so written that it would be "uncertain" whether the
government would or would not intervene in a labor dispute; uncertain
whether the President might or might not seize an industry in case of
12 Text at 13-18, 34.
13 Id. at 25-34.
14 Id. at 35.
15 Landis, Administrative Agencies in Government, Dutm's REP. 7 (Nov. 1932),
quoted in text at 3.
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strikes jeopardizing the national welfare; uncertain likewise whether the
President would do so with or without a prior fact-finding board.I
6
Judge Vanderbilt also cites the Emergency Price Control Act as an in-
stance of the "studied effort to comply with the constitutional forms
while withholding their substance." 17
He is, however, no mere "viewer with alarm." He has hopes for the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,18 although doubtful about
numerous exceptions to the application of the Act.19 He has anticipated
President Eisenhower's appointment of the Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations by his thoughtful suggestion that the time has come to
re-examine which of the many governmental and administrative func-
tions now exercised by the Federal government might be returned to state
or local control. The test on the face of it, of course, will be efficiency.
Readers will see that this is not the whole story. Value-judgments are
involved. Chasmic differences of opinion will be inevitable. Compromise,
the way of 1787, will undoubtedly also be the way of 1954. For some,
Federalism is not just an accident of our history and presently an
anachronism, but rather, an invaluable way of preserving Liberty by
keeping dispersed that absolute power which stifles it. For others, the end
of Federalism holds no terrors, if we can, by force of the ballot in free
elections, keep government doing, in Dean Landis' words, "what we now
expect government to do." 20
Judge Vanderbilt's final lecture deals with "judicial deference" as a
cause of "constitutional imbalance" today. The late Chief Justice Stone
once reminded his brethren of the necessity of judicial self-restraint in
approaching constitutional questions. 2' Is judicial deference to the legis-
lature and the executive, and now full-blown in its application to ad-
ministrative findings, the normal, logical development? When does
judicial deference become judicial abdication 22 so as to threaten the
existence of the separation of powers doctrine? Space again requires the
reviewer to resist quoting from the third lecture in detail, other than to
indicate some examples, such as: judicial acquiescence in administrative
"expertise"; congressional action denying essential judicial functions to
the courts by stripping courts of equity of injunctive powers; precluding
access by an aggrieved individual to the regular courts, and thus curtail-
ing the power of courts to adjudicate on the validity of statutes and
administrative regulations.
16 Text at 81, n. 78.
'7 Id. at 82.
18 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1946).
19 Text at 87-88.
20 LAiis, THE An usRTivx PROCESs at 49 as quoted in text at S.
21 U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1935) (Dissenting opinion).
22 Palmer, Causes of Dissents: Judicial Self-Restraint or Abdication, 34 A.BA.J.
761 (1948).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Judge Vanderbilt fully documents his case for the imperilling of
separation of powers by judicial deference. He is not one of those "good
plain people" who pay "uncritical veneration" 23 to the separation of
powers doctrine "embroidered by pontifical moral phrases." 24 He has the
courage to suggest that if the congressional power to spend to "promote
the general welfare" is not limited, as Madison claimed,25 to the objects
of the powers specifically enumerated in Article I, Sec. 8 of the Con-
stitution, there should be some way in which such congressional bounties
can be reviewed or tested by litigants in the courts. If the "Theory of the
Welfare State" is to receive tacit judicial benediction, is Massachusetts
v. Mellon26 to remain the law? If so, it is difficult to see how very much
can be done to return government to its proper bounds by restoring that
balance in government which the Constitution intended. In concluding
Justice Vanderbilt says: 27
On respect for the doctrine of separation of powers, not as a technical rule
of law, but as a guide to the sound functioning of government, rests not
only the stability of this nation but of every other nation and the freedom
not only of our own citizens but of the citizens of every other country.
The doctrine must be universal in its application if stability and liberty are
to be sought and obtained.
If, as others would have them do, the American people decide to bury
the checks and balances principle of government and the separation of
powers doctrine which is a part of it, they should at least understand the
true nature of that which they are consigning to the dust.
Edward F. Barrett*
THE STRANGE CASE op ALGER Hiss. By The Earl Jowitt.1 New York:
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1953. Pp. 380. $3.95. This interesting and
provocative book by a distinguished British lawyer could not fail to
arouse strong comment on the part of those who read it. The very nature
of the subject matter alone would be a guarantee of that. The trial of
Alger Hiss is an event that casts its shadow on our generation as other
famous criminal proceedings have stirred former ones. In addition, Earl
Jowitt's treatment of his subject, although moderate in style, is fierce in
purpose and result; it could not help but exacerbate all the passionately
23 Kennedy, Book Review, 28 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 573 (1953).
24 LANDIS, TnE ADi rsTRA=v PROCESs at 49 as quoted in text at 3.
25 U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1935).
26 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
27 Text at 143-144.
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1 Formerly Lord Chancellor of Great Britain.
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partisan voices of the right and left who see in the verdict reached in the
Hiss case a vindication, or betrayal, as the case may be, of their own
political philosophies.
However, it should not be the purpose of a book review in a legal
periodical to stray too far from the area of what should be its more
technical and germane enquiry. For that purpose, it may be pointed out
that the author wrote with the acknowledged intent of calling attention
to the consequences, so far as the Hiss case was concerned, which "arise
from the differing functions assigned in the American and in the English
jurisdictions to judge and counsel." 2 An admirable purpose this is, and,
to the extent adhered to, supplies the bench and bar with interesting in-
sights into the comparative advantages and disadvantages of both
systems.
However, in this reviewer's opinion, Lord Jowitt perverts what should
have been an objective comparison of two types of trial court criminal
procedures, to serve a demonstrably biased end. There is no doubt that
the author believes that Hiss was convicted erroneously. There is even
less doubt that he is convinced that if the defendant had been tried in a
British court, or at least in Jowitt's, he would have been acquitted.
Believing as he does, it is not surprising that the author has succumbed
to the very human temptation among authors to subvert technique to
conviction, to use it to support a conclusion, rather than to illuminate
and instruct.
There are found throughout the book many examples of this misuse of
method to serve belief. For instance, the author complains, with a good
deal of justification, that the American courts allow too many excursions
in attempts to impeach the credibility of witnesses. Few can quarrel with
that observation. Most readers could appreciate also that this license of
cross-examination worked to the disadvantage of Hiss on occasion during
the trial. However, what this reviewer cannot let pass without comment
is the fact that the author is patently inconsistent in applying his own
point. For, when it comes to the prosecution's witnesses, especially
Whittaker Chambers, Lord Jowitt's solicitude for confining examination
to the issues vanishes. He is the first to refer to Chambers' unsavory
past, or his admitted deceptions and untruths, as detracting from his
present testimony under oath.3 He complains of the admission into evi-
dence of the memorandum of Adolph Berle to whom, in 1939, Chambers
described Hiss as a Communist. Yet, later, he makes much of the fact
that Chambers on that occasion had referred to Mrs. Hiss as only a
Socialist and not as a Communist.4 He excuses the understandable diffi-
culties which Hiss may have had in testifying clearly and consistently
2 Text at 6.
8 Id. at 222.
4 Id. at 77.
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with respect to events which occurred ten years before the trial. But let
Chambers suffer from similar disability of memory and narration, and the
author seizes upon them to impugn severely the latter's testimony.
The author reminds us that British counsel are restrained by pro-
fessional training and trial court supervision from indulging in provoca-
tive or prejudicial rhetoric.5 Implicit usually, but explicit from time to
time, is the author's feeling that Mr. Murphy, the prosecutor of Hiss,
violates this British standard of courtroom decorum. The book is silent
about, and this reviewer is not familiar with, defense counsel's conduct
along these lines in the second trial. However, the papers at the time
related in detail, and no one can doubt, the devastatingly vituperative
attack made upon Chambers, as a person and as a witness, by Mr. Lloyd
Stryker, defense counsel in the first trial, and a master of purple rhetoric.
There are other examples of this double standard of analysis which
is used by the author. Together they have turned what might have
been an invaluable clinical appraisal of this famous case by an objective
foreign observer and student, into an advocate's well written brief on
appeal. However, the author's appeal lies only to the court of American
public opinion. It is this reviewer's opinion that on that score his book
must be accepted for what it is. The Strange Case of Alger Hiss is not
even a moderately objective effort to unwind the terribly deep mystery
of a man whose conviction by a jury of his peers has not been able to
dissipate successfully the doubts that still remain concerning his guilt or
innocence.
That Lord Jowitt succumbed to his prejudices on this question is
doubly unfortunate. First, his bias detracts from the conceded merits of
a splendidly written book. Secondly, it will only serve to fan the fires
of controversy between those who cite the guilt of Hiss as prima facie
evidence of the collective treason of the New Deal and all its works, and
those who placed all their shallow faith in the virtues of that era on the
innocence of one who betrayed it. The guilt of Alger Hiss is personal;
it can not impeach the great majority of those who served their fellow
Americans loyally and effectively during the 1930's. It is a pity that
Jowitt's book, although unintended for that purpose, will obfuscate
further that fundamental fact.
Alfred Long Scanlan*
5 Id. at 206.
* Member of the District of Columbia and Indiana Bars.
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